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Abstract
The use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to realize and operate public infrastructures is often as-
sociated with fiscal circumventing motivations. Using data at the municipal level, this paper investigates
whether budget-constrained public authorities adopt PPPs in order to hide public debts. The results show
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1. Introduction
Lately, financial restraints stemming from domestic policies, financial markets, or regulatory measures
have significantly shaped the behavior of public decision makers. 1 In particular, the shortage of financial
resources has substantially altered the government’s choices concerning public investment and spending.
In this context, in contrast to traditional public investment methods, hybrid organizational forms such as
public-private partnerships (PPPs) are often considered as a way to release public budget. For example, as
announced by the United States Secretary of Transportation (Financial Times, 29 September 2015): “even
in the “rosiest” political scenarios, there would not be enough public money forthcoming to plug a $1tn
infrastructure funding gap through to the end of the decade”, and “public private partnerships can continue
to play a role in helping us close that gap”. 2
Following Hart (2003), PPPs are defined as contractual agreements allowing long-term involvement of
private sector capital and expertise in the realization and management of a public asset that will be returned
to the public sector after an adequate period of time. PPPs are therefore distinguished from traditional
forms of public procurement where the financing is exclusively public, and the construction, maintenance
and operation tasks are separately entrusted to di erent private companies. Although public actors have
widely adopted PPPs in the context of budget constraints both at the national level (Hammami et al., 2006)
and at the local level (Albalate et al., 2015), the motivations behind such decisions are subject to debate.
One explanation for public actors’ adoption of PPPs under budget constraints is debt hiding. Indeed,
following the rule established by Eurostat in 2004, 3 PPPs can be accounted o -balance-sheet (Eurostat,
2004). 4 In this sense, by using PPPs, public authorities may achieve requirements of balanced budgets, and
gain voters’ support in the short term.
This study focuses on this issue and better explains the reason behind public actors’ decision to choose
PPPs when facing financial restraints. More specifically, we try to find evidence for managers’ adoption
of a PPP strategy based only on a fiscal circumventing motivations, that is, taking public debt o  the
balance sheet. To the best of our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence on this topic. We contribute
to the literature by studying more in details the PPP choice under budget constraints. Our conclusion can
therefore provide a better understanding of PPP adoption from both a theoretical and practical perspective.
To address our questions, we first use data from France to empirically test whether local governments
are more likely to use PPPs when under budget constraints. Exploiting a feature of the French institutional
context, where it has been mandatory for a local PPP to be accounted for on public record since January 1,
1. In the European Union, one prominent example is the limits on deficits and debt imposed through the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty.
2. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/68d283a6-662a-11e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5.html#ixzz3rqyjLTPh
3. For more details on the Eurostat rule, see section 3.2.
4. Even with the recent International Public Sector Accounting Standard 32 which reconsidered this option, PPPs classifi-
cation has not been significantly modified because most countries deviate from international standards (Funke et al., 2013).
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2011, we are then able to identify whether this behavior occurs because of a fiscal circumventing motivation,
i.e., debt hiding. As a conclusion, we find that strict budget constraints are associated with a more frequent
tendency to invest through a PPP. However, although the new rule negatively impacts the use of PPPs, the
e ect of budget constraints persists, especially when financial costs are considered. We therefore conclude
that the adoption of PPPs is determined by restrictions on financial resources and not merely from debt-
hiding motivations. Thus, we finally discuss alternative explanations for the more frequent use of PPPs by
budget-constrained public authorities.
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related literature and derives testable hypo-
theses. Section 3 discusses the French institutional context and legal environment regulating PPPs. Section
4 describes the data and our empirical approach. Section 5 reports the analysis result and robustness checks.
Section 6 discusses several main results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2. Related literature and hypotheses
2.1. Financial constraints and PPP
An increasing strand of literature focuses on the comparison between PPPs and more traditional forms
of procurement with the purpose of detecting the pros and cons of the two methods for delivering high-
quality public services at a low cost for taxpayers. In particular, the use of a PPP enables the government to
establish a long-term agreement with private actors (private firms and banks) at the beginning of a project.
On the one hand, the stronger involvement of private players together with the transfer of risks implies a
better ex-ante assessment of the project and provides major incentives for early innovations able to reduce
long-term maintenance and operational costs (Iossa and Martimort, 2015; Martimort and Pouyet, 2008;
Legros and Dewatripont, 2005; Hart, 2003). On the other hand, an early commitment in situations of future
uncertainties implies a lower level of flexibility and substantially increases the possibility of ex-post costly
renegotiations (Guash et al., 2008; Martimort and Straub, forthcoming).
Previous papers have largely addressed the problem of the optimal mechanism to enhance private in-
centives, expecially in contexts of contract incompleteness (see also de Bettignies and Ross, 2009) and
asymmetric information (see also Hoppe and Schmitz, 2013). However, the public side of the partnership
has been only marginally taken into account. Indeed, public spending decisions are also a ected by other
aspects such as the state of public finance or institutional and political concerns. The public perspective is
mainly considered by only a few scholars who study whether it is optimal to select PPPs with the purpose of
releasing public funds in situations of public budget constraints, either for a benevolent or a non-benevolent
government.
In the first case, knowing that the stronger the budget constraint, the higher the distortion imposed on
taxpayers to collect investment funds, the government aims at choosing the best alternative to minimize
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such distortionary taxation. According to Engel et al. (2013), in a multiperiod context and without the
presence of asymmetric information, PPPs are able to reduce the costs of collecting public funds only in
the case of current liquidity constraints, i.e., the distortions caused by the lower governmental spending
capacity are expected to be higher at time t compared to t + 1. The paper by Auriol and Picard (2013)
introduced a parameter of adverse selection. More precisely, under the PPP solution (build-operate-transfer
[BOT] contracts), the private actor is the project manager and it is allowed to operate under a laissez-faire
regime. However, under the traditional forms of procurement, the public actor is the project manager and
entrusts the realization of the public project to more informed private actors. The presence of asymmetric
information implies more costly contracts and, as a consequence, higher public finance distortions. Bundling
two unrelated tasks in a condition of a sequential moral hazard is studied by Schmitz (2013) and Buso
(2014). In the former model, the author assumes that, under bundling, the private agent receives a single
payment for both tasks. In the latter model, a separate payment for each period is possible, 5 while the
private agent is wealth-constrained (limited liability rent) over the two periods. According to the model of
Schmitz (2013), in the case of bundling, the principal must make a very large payment to the agent when
both tasks are successfully completed. As a consequence, the principal strictly prefers separation when it
is wealth-constrained. Nevertheless, according to Buso (2014), when separate payments are possible in the
case of bundling, the presence of a single limited liability constraint makes incentives less costly thanks to
the higher level of rent extraction by the principal; this last e ect is stronger the more the government is
wealth-constrained.
When the assumption of a benevolent government is relaxed, the public choice can be a ected by op-
portunistic behaviors and/or external pressures. First, governments can choose PPPs to benefit from a
temporary delay in payments. This possibility comes from the fact that, in case of a PPP, public transfers to
private companies normally start when the construction of the infrastructure is completed. Then, regardless
of the presence of current liquidity constraints (Engel et al., 2013), mayors may opt for PPPs to shift the
burden of payments to future local governments. This e ect is mainly interesting in the case of high level
of political competition (Phuong-Tra, 2014). Second, lobbies can try to influence the allocation of a limited
amount of funds to di erent projects. Following this guidance, Maskin and Tirole (2008) show that through
PPPs projects, true costs can be assessed earlier, making it hard for the o cial to push through her favorite
project. Indeed, in the presence of a tight spending limit, through pre-evaluation, private finance leads to
greater public investment.
On the empirical side, evidence is found for the impact of fiscal restrictions on the choice of PPPs. At the
local government level, Russo and Zampino (2010) correlate PPP investment and municipal budget data in
the Italian context. They show a strong positive relationship between local public debt and the number of
5. In the case of France, PPPs allow for the presence of periodical payments.
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PPP projects. Deficit, in contrast, is not statistically related to PPP choice. Similarly, Albalate et al. (2015)
find a positive impact of debt on the level of private involvement in public projects in the US. However, their
results show a negative impact from tax revenue. They argue that states with higher revenues are likely to
be less reliant on private investment. Hence self-finance capacities seem to have the opposite e ect of debt.
We then develop our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: When governments are financially constrained, public managers are more likely to
use PPPs than traditional forms of procurement to realize public infrastructure.
2.2. PPP under financial restraints: fiscal circumvention motivations
Generally, decision makers of firms operating under financial restraints are more likely to distort their
reported financial performance (Adams et al., 2008). On the one hand, through this practice, decision
makers strive to raise capital and attract external financing by showing a better financial report than
they would otherwise (Linck et al., 2013). On the other hand, this behavior is also explained by the self-
interested motivations of managers that aim at boosting their own compensations (Burns and Kedia, 2006)
or addressing their career concerns (DeFond and Park, 1997).
In the public sector, governments are also found to react to financial constraints. The public finance
literature focuses on this topic in a general way and stresses that public actors have an incentive to shift
debt o  the public budget, potentially to meet fiscal constraints or to gain voters’ support. Originally,
according to his theoretical model, Easterly (1999)’s claims that constraints on conventional measures of
budget deficits or public debt will only induce an illusionary fiscal adjustment since government will prevent
changes to its net worth. The argument states that governments seek to maintain current spending levels
while reducing explicit debt and deficits, by “(1) cutting public investment, (2) privatization, (3) shifting
revenue and expenditure over time, or (4) running implicit liabilities.” For instance, empirically, the adoption
of the Stability and Growth Pact in the European Union seemed to be associated with a greater use of fiscal
gimmicks. Governments are found to use stock-flow adjustments such as annual changes in the debt level
to meet the deficit requirement (Buti et al., 2007; Von Hagen and Wol , 2006). With a similar objective,
Milesi-Ferretti and Moriyama (2006) take a di erent approach and find that the reduction of government
debt in the EU is correlated with a reduction of government assets in the context of euro adoption. This result
suggests that “an exclusive focus on deficit and debt levels conveys a misleading picture of the evolution of
the underlying fiscal situation”.
Following the previous arguments, the adoption of PPPs in a budget-constraint context might be ex-
plained by debt-hiding motivations (the possibility to be accounted o -balance-sheet; Eurostat, 2004). In
isolating these specific reasons, we evaluate their relevance and the extent to which they explain the financial
restraint e ect on the use of PPPs.
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Hypothesis 2: Without the possibility of debt hiding, the impact of financial restraints on the use
of PPPs should decrease significantly.
3. Institutional details
In this section, we first focus on describing French municipalities’ budget elaboration and control pro-
cesses. Then, we analyze how PPP accounting rules can lead to debt-hiding behaviors.
3.1. French municipalities’ budgets
France has 36,000 municipalities, which are called “communes” and represent the fifth administrative
level in France. Each has a mayor and a municipal council, who jointly manage the area’s administration
and have exactly the same powers no matter the commune’s size. In terms of investment, they are in charge
of pre-primary and primary schools, libraries, cultural/sport centers, and urban equipment. The principle of
municipal self-government gives the municipality wide scope to take responsibility for its own investments,
organization, and financing. However, following the General Code for Local Authorities, 6 their budgets
are constrained, as they have to achieve a balanced public account for both the investment and operation
sections. This balanced budget requirement contains both political and technical dimensions according to
Hou (2006). The control is carried out by either the Administrative Courts or the Regional Court of Accounts
(Chambre régional des Comptes). The first control includes the Prefect’s supervision over the e ective balance
of municipalities’ accounts, as well as the possibility of the administrative courts taking action against a
mayor’s misuse of power. The second instrument aims at checking both the ex ante achievement of the
balanced budget requirement and ex post excessive deficits with respect to balanced budget targets from 5
to 10%.
In such a context, heavily indebted municipalities have higher levels of budget constraints placed upon
their ability to achieve their infrastructures investment strategies (CES, 2012). Public investment levels in
France are known to have dropped in the 1990s due to hard budget constraints and a high level of public debt.
In fact, existing debt is a burden for municipalities’ operating and investment budgets: a high level of existing
debt pushes up both the corresponding financial costs (which are part of the operating expenses) and the
annual debt service (which is part of the investment expenses). As a consequence, the self-financing capacity
of these municipalities is reduced. In order to achieve the same level of investment as other municipalities,
they can only take larger and more costly loans from commercial banks.
6. France’s General Code for Local Authorities (Code général des collectivités territoriales - CGCT) includes laws and
regulations applied to local authorities’ three main levels: municipality, department, and region.
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3.2. PPP and debt-hiding motivations
As discussed above, the fact that PPP can be accounted o -balance-sheet following the Eurostat decision
in 2004 seemed to o er a possible method to circumvent budget constraints. The Eurostat rule classifies
infrastructure realized through PPPs as non-governmental through the “risks and rewards” criterion (Eu-
rostat, 2004). Following this guidance, public authorities have accounted PPPs o -balance-sheet when the
construction risk and at least one of either availability or demand risk are transferred to the private operator.
In such a manner, a PPP is accounted based on the logic of accrual accounting: the annual payment related
to investment, financial, and operating costs is reflected in the public account; the remaining debt element
is accounted as a multi-annual plan of payment in an appendix to the balance sheet. As a consequence, debt
corresponding to a PPP does not appear on the public balance sheet.
This accounting rule might increase incentives in favor of PPP procedures for reasons other than the
to-be-achieved target of value for money. The first level is the budgetary level; PPPs can enable public
authorities lacking a su cient capital budget to achieve their desired capital investment strategy. In fact,
while a traditionally procured capital project presents a significant immediate hit to a municipality’s capital
budget, PPPs will have a smaller impact. Second, the French target, in place since 2005 to reduce Public
Sector Net Debt from 86% of the GDP (2014) to under 60%, could provide an incentive favoring PPPs
over spending funded directly by government borrowing. This reflects the fact that in the short term, a
PPP scheme would result in reduced government borrowing, i.e., a lower level of Public Sector Net Debt.
Third, European level requirements, via the the Maastricht Treaty, oblige member states to avoid excessive
budgetary deficits. More precisely, the treaty states that governments’ annual deficit and debt should not
exceed: (a) 3% for the ratio of planned or actual government deficit to GDP at market prices and (b) 60% for
the ratio of government debt to GDP at market prices (OJEU, 2004). These European fiscal rules therefore
motivate the use of investment methods that allow o -balance-sheet accounting. Finally, public managers’
self-interest cannot be excluded. Indeed, a mayor might choose PPPs according to a debt-hiding strategy in
order to improve the public account with the objective of gaining voters’ support.
However, at the end of 2010, the French Government introduced a decree on the topic of PPP accounting
rules. This decree requires PPP projects at the local level to be recognized on the balance sheet and applies
to both existing and new projects. Two reasons motivated this clarification of PPP accounting. First, it
reflects a desire to follow the UK experience regarding PPPs, which is the most advanced in the world.
Indeed, in 2011, the UK Government committed to providing more transparency of PPP accounting. The
O ce for Budget Responsibility decided to include an assessment of the impact of PPP liabilities in their
fiscal sustainability report-a break with previous years’ National Accounts. Second, the application of the
International Financial Reporting Standards (hereafter IFRS) implied a switch from the previously used
“risks and rewards” criterion to control criteria for PPP accounting. More precisely, under a PPP, if the
public authority controls one of the following five aspects of the project, the corresponding debt should be
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accounted on-balance-sheet: (a) the private operator is not able to sell or take out a loan on the equipment,
(b) the occupation of a public-owned domain, (c) the definition of the equipment’s main features, (d) public
services’ management, and (e) the revenue paid to the private operator for his service. This new rule has
led to the recognition of the asset and corresponding debt upon the infrastructure’s delivery on the public
account. In other words, the balance sheet records the investment’s capital value as an asset, while the
already-paid investment and remaining debt are recorded as liabilities.
4. Data and empirical strategy
The main data and results are reported in the present paper. More detailed tables and robustness
checks are reported in the online appendix available at https://sites.google.com/site/busomarco/ (author’s
website).
4.1. Data
To address our questions, we develop a unique panel dataset that includes data on - PPP projects from the
MaPPP, - municipalities’ financial, political, and managerial characteristics from the Ministry of Economy
and Finances, the Center of Socio-Political Data at the Paris Institute of Political Studies (the Sciences Po
Center), and the Ministry of Interior. The dataset covers the 2004-2013 period and contains information on
both collectivities that have and have not executed a PPP. The group of public administrations that have
not implemented a PPP was chosen using a propensity score matching strategy on the basis of local and
demographic characteristics furnished by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies
(INSEE). We chose to focus our analysis on the municipal level instead of including the two other levels of
public administration, i.e., department and region. This enables us to examine comparable public entities
with the same power of decision making regarding public investment. Moreover, all studied dimensions are
equivalent among them. In the next paragraphs, we detail, step by step, the procedure implemented to
obtain our final panel dataset.
4.1.1. Treated group: PPP dataset
Our principal dataset comprises all the 101 PPP projects enacted at the municipal level. These projects
were concluded between the date of creation of a PPP market (January 2004) and August 2013 by 92
municipalities and 3 inter-municipalities. 7 We choose the biggest municipality of the inter-municipalities as
the public actor to preserve the comparability of the 101 observations. We collaborated with the MaPPP
department to collect the main project characteristics, such as the concerned public entity, year of signature,
type of project, and its capital value.
7. The other two levels of public administration have concluded 37 PPP projects.
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Figure 1 describes PPP trends at the French municipal level since 2004. The number of PPPs remained
stable from 2007 to 2010 and then increased considerably after 2011 before finally decelerating in 2013. The
cumulative amount of projects, i.e., the value of the projects’ capital investment, increased through 2008,
declined in 2009, increased again in 2010, and again declined in 2012. We also note that our sample includes
55 PPP projects before 2011 and 56 after 2011. Therefore, the two groups are equivalent in terms of number
for a comparison of the e ect of the 2011 decree.
4.1.2. Control group: matching strategy
We used a matching strategy to select a control group that is similar to our treated group in terms of
the need for public infrastructure. This need is determined through a dataset describing the characteristics
of all 36,000 French municipalities provided by the INSEE. 8 The use of a matching strategy particularly fits
our need. Indeed, this choice-based sampling design is used in evaluation studies where the potential control
population is much larger than the treatment sample (Heckman and Todd, 2009; Rubin and Thomas, 2000;
Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).
Following previous studies, we first use a logistic regression and a nearest neighbor estimation (neighbor
(3)) to estimate the propensity score. The dependent variable is a dummy describing whether a municipality
has undertaken a PPP investment. The covariates represent municipalities’ need for infrastructure. We not
only follow Bahl and Duncombe (1993) in using municipality population (in 2009 and 1999) and income
level (in 2009) to measure public investment demand, but we also include additional variables covering the
years 1999, 2009, and 2010 9: area, number of households, total tax revenues, number of workers, number of
unemployed people, population age distribution, number of firms in di erent sectors, number of public firms,
and number of small and medium enterprises. Second, we choose the two nearest neighbor observations in
terms of propensity score for each municipality in our treatment group. We thus finally obtain a sample of
303 municipalities, with 101 included in the PPP group (“treated group") and 202 in the group without PPP
(“control" group). We further control for the balancing of observable municipal variables along the 1998 to
2010 period in tables 1 and 2. 10
4.1.3. Financial and political datasets
We collected financial data for the 2003-2012 period for virtually all French municipalities from the web-
site of the Ministry of Economy and Finances to analyze our research questions. 11 This dataset documents
the general financial information of each municipality’s yearly accounting statement, such as investments and
8. This dataset is available on the INSEE website.
9. We consider municipal characteristics related to both the period preceding the introduction of a PPP’s market and the
years just before the implementation of the 2011 legislation.
10. Due to this control, we can ensure that the municipalities in the two groups are similar with respect to the observable
variables for the entire time interval 1998-2010.
11. This financial information is available on the website www.colloc.bercy.gouv.fr. We collected this information through
the Python program. The dataset is therefore available from the authors upon request.
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expenses as well as revenue structure, including deficits and public debt. In this dataset, municipalities are
organized into 30 “reference groups” classified by population size, participation in the public establishment
of inter-municipal cooperation, and any additional tax systems adopted by the inter-municipal institution.
For each reference group, the average value of each financial dimension is provided. In our analysis, as a
further control for municipalities’ heterogeneity, we use the di erence between the municipality’s value and
the average of its reference group as financial covariates. 12
Two other datasets are used to capture political and managerial dimensions. The first one comes from
the Sciences Po Center. This dataset contains the main information regarding municipal elections - for
example, the mayor’s political party. We complement this by adding information on the mayor’s personal
characteristics taken from the National Repertory of Politicians dataset of the Ministry of Interior. 13
4.1.4. Final panel dataset
Finally, we obtain a panel dataset enabling us to compute the e ect of a municipality’s financial constraint
on the use of PPPs instead of alternative organizational forms. Table 3 presents the main financial characte-
ristics of our treated and control groups. The reported values are the means over the period 2003-2012. On
average, the investment amount in PPP is 32.3 million of euros for the treated group. This value is logically
0 for the control group. In general, we observe a better financial situation for the control group. Indeed, they
have higher positive results both in the operation section, i.e., operation ≠ result (5.5 million euro versus
4.8 million euro) and the entire budget, i.e., overall≠ result (5.9 million euro versus 4.7 million euro). They
also receive less subsidies from the central government (21.6 million euro versus 24.4 million euro). Their
level of debt is nevertheless lower than the treated group, both in terms of stock debt (45.2 million euro
versus 63.6 million euro) and annual debt payment (5.6 million euro versus versus 9.3 million euro). These
figures therefore show that the control group has a better self-financing capacity than the treatment group.
They also invest more than the treated group (29.9 millions of euros versus 26.2 millions of euros). We then
suppose that public actors from this group prefer alternative organizational forms other than PPP to realize
their investment in infrastructures.
4.2. Description of variables
As we use a panel database covering the period 2004 to 2013, all variables are defined for each municipality
i and each year t. Table 4 reports the variables’ descriptions with the expected signs.
12. We also consider the gross value of each financial dimension as a robustness check, and we find that the main results
do not di er. For the remainder of the paper, we therefore only refer to the financial covariates as the di erence between the
municipality’s value and the average of its reference group.
13. These two datasets are available from these organizations upon request.
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4.2.1. Time variables
As previously discussed, we are interested in explaining the use of PPPs by French municipalities; thus,
we introduce the dependent variable pppit. If municipality i in year t has implemented a PPP, then pppit
is equal to one in t and until the end of the time interval, i.e., 2013; and equals zero for the entire period
before year t. This type of time variable is used to perform the duration analysis presented in Section 4.3.
However, when presenting the robustness checks, we use a di erent dependent variable that equals one if
municipality i in year t has implemented a PPP, and zero otherwise.
4.2.2. Explanatory variables
As there is no universally accepted measure of financially constrained firms (Linck et al., 2013), and
even less so for the public sector and municipality financial situation, we consider three measures for our
explanatory variables. These variables are lagged by one year to avoid endogeneity issues. We follow Bahl
and Duncombe (1993) in using both stock and flow measures for debt burden. The stock variable, debtit≠1,
captures the municipality’s ex ante exogenous situation. We then use two flow variables to measure how a
municipality’s conditions change during the period preceding the investment start: annual ≠ paymentit≠1
captures annual debt expenses (interest and capital reimbursement), and self ≠ financeit≠1 captures a
municipality’s self-financing capacity (the surplus from the operating budget that can be used to finance
new investment net of the reimbursements in capital of loans). 14
Debt-hiding incentives for engaging in PPPs in France were ruled out in 2011. We explain this legal
discontinuity by introducing the variable rulet, which equals one for periods of time following January 1,
2011 and zero otherwise. 15 We are interested in the interaction term among rulet and each financial restraint
proxy. These interaction terms show the extent to which the e ect of budget constraint (each proxy) changes
after 2011.
Finally, we include the post2011 statistic, which is the sum of the coe cient of each financial proxy with
that of the interaction term between the explanatory variable and the rule dummy. These values capture
the e ects of each proxy on the use of PPPs after 2011.
4.2.3. Control variables
Given that we have a panel database and are comparing similar municipalities in terms of population
features, we first select those financial covariates that vary over time and that could influence both the
dependent variable and financial restraint proxies. We consider financial variables that reflect municipalities’
capacity to deal with both the investment’s demand and the balanced budget requirements. The first variable
14. The notation of financial agencies such as Moody’s would be a good measure for a municipality’s financial situation.
However, this notation is currently not available for all French municipalities.
15. In our regressions, we use the interaction between the dummy rulet and a trend variable to capture the change in trend
on the probability to implement PPP after the application of the decree.
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controls for the balancing of the operating and the investment budgets as required by the balanced budget
specifications. We use budget≠resultit≠1, which is the di erence between the operation≠resultit≠1 and the
investment spending of municipality i at t≠ 1. Finally, we consider two other variables that control for both
the size of the investment and the level of the ex ante available resources: investmentit≠1, which captures
the total level of investment by municipality i at t≠1, and subsidiesit≠1, which reflects the level of national
support the municipality received for its investment plans at t≠ 1.
We then include three political dimensions that may a ect the selection of a PPP at the municipal level:
leftit≠1, centerit≠1, or rightit≠1, which equal one if the mayor of municipality i is from the left (center or
right) wing party at t≠1 and is zero otherwise. The variable femaleit≠1 represents the sex of the mayor and
equals one if the mayor of municipality i is female at t≠ 1 and is zero otherwise. These measures are widely
used in the literature to examine organizational choices (see Phuong-Tra, 2014, for a review). In addition,
we include the institutional proxy EQI (European Quality of Government Index) at the regional level. This
index is the combination of the level of corruption, protection of the rule of law, government e ectiveness,
and accountability at regional levels in the 27 EU Member States. The measures are collected in 172 EU
regions, based on a survey of 34,000 residents across 18 countries (Charron et al., 2014) and controls for the
municipality’s institutional aspect.
Finally, we add three variables capturing municipalities’ characteristics: populationit≠1 (the log of the
population of each municipality), incomeit≠1 (the log of the income of each municipality), and firmit≠1
(the log of number of firms in each municipality). When we applied the matching procedure, we had already
considered these variables related to year 2009 (and 1999 for population). We further include these covariates
in the regressions to control for changes over time in the main municipalities’ characteristics. 16
4.3. Empirical strategy
We explore the determinants of a municipality’s decision to use a PPP or to wait before and after 2011,
as this year marks the introduction of a new accounting rule into the legal system.
As some municipalities decide to invest after the creation of a PPP market, di erent investment times are
available during the 2004-2013 period. The starting year is the same for every municipality (2004); however,
the data are incomplete. Municipalities that did not invest within the period are necessarily right censoring.
Duration or hazard models are designed to consider this issue (Machin et al., 2006; Hosmer et al., 1999;
Chen, 2002).
Time is the outcome variable of interest in duration or survival analyses. More precisely, the dependent
variable is defined as survival time because it provides the interval until a certain event (failure) occurs.
The terminology suggests that the main application areas are health and financial economics. However, this
16. The results did not change when we ruled out these variables.
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approach can be applied to any type of event that a ects individuals in di erent moments. Our research
question is a suitable application of the duration analysis because increasing numbers of municipalities used
PPPs during the 2005-2013 period, and we can expect this technique to become even more widespread
among public operators over the long run.
In our case, investment action under a PPP represents the event (failure), whereas the survival time
is given by the number of years until an investment occurs under a PPP. In such an analysis, we use the
entire database comprising both our treated and control groups. Thus, the time is right censoring for all
municipalities that do not experience the event prior to 2013.
The introductory step of the survival analysis consists of computing the Kaplan-Meier survival curve,
S(t), and the Hazard rate function, h(t). The first is computed year by year and reports the proportion of
municipalities that survive (do not use PPP) over time. The second gives the instantaneous potential per
unit time for the event to occur given the survival up to time t.
The next step enables us to assess the relationship between explanatory variables and survival time.
More precisely, it enables us to identify the factors determining the probability of implementing a PPP and
examine the impact of the new rule on this propensity to use PPP. We approach the problem through two
methods that aim at computing the hazard rate, that is, the instantaneous event rate.
The first is a semi-parametric method: the Cox proportional hazard model. This model makes the major
assumption that the hazard rate (instantaneous event rate) is proportional to the covariates (PH assump-
tion). This means that the risk of failure (PPP use) is the same regardless of the duration for which the
municipality has been followed (Hosmer et al., 1999). This assumption is plausible for our analysis, where
the probability to invest in PPP should not depend on how much time has elapsed since 2004, the beginning
year of our study. However, we perform a statistical test (stphtest) to assess the PH assumption: we first
implement a PH global test that simultaneously controls for all covariates; then, we graphically test the PH
assumption for the budget constraint regressors. The main regression for the Cox-Ph model is as follows:
h(t, x,—) = h0(t)f(x,—), (1)
where h0(t) is proportional to the survivor time, while f(x,—) characterizes how the hazard function
changes as a function of our covariates. We include the financial, accounting, and political dimensions pre-
viously described as control variables to capture the institutional di erences among municipalities a ecting
the propensity to invest in PPPs. The strategy’s second method comprises implementing a full parametric
model where survival time is assumed to follow a known distribution.
We assume the most common Weibull distribution, which is a general distribution based on two parame-
ters that can be reduced to an exponential distribution if the hazard is assumed to be constant over time.
The hazard rate function that we will estimate through this method is expressed as follows:
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(e—0+—1x)⁄ (2)
We then run a parametric model for each financial restraint proxy and use as control variables the same
covariates we include in the Cox-Ph model. A graphical method for checking the validity of the Weibull
distribution is provided by examining the Kaplan-Meier log curves against log survival time. The graph in
Figure 2 reports a straight line, thus providing evidence that the distribution of survival times follows a
Weibull distribution.
5. Results and robustness checks
5.1. Results
We first report the results of the computation of the Kaplan-Meier survival curve, S(t), and the Hazard
rate function, h(t), in Figure 3. The first graph looks like a step function given the discrete time. Prior to
2004, the survival probability equals 1; after this year, some municipalities began to invest. At the end of
the time period, the probability of investment is approximately 30%. This result reflects the composition
of our dataset, which comprises 101 municipalities with a PPP and 202 control municipalities that did not
implement any PPP. The hazard rate function highlights the increasing conditional likelihood to invest under
PPP up to year 2011. Subsequently, after the application of the new accounting rule, the line indicates a
downward trend.
Before presenting the main results of the semi-parametric method under the Cox proportional hazard
model, the global test lets us argue that the PH assumption is not violated in the implemented models (last
two lines of Table 5). We further control for whether or not the budget constraint proxies separately respect
the PH assumption. Figures A1, A2, and A3 in the online appendix report the fitted curves. They appear
horizontal, which means that the scaled Schoenfeld residuals are independent with respect to survival time.
Our main results of the Cox proportional hazard model are reported in the first six columns of Table 5.
We report the hazard ratios to facilitate the economic interpretation of our results. In the online appendix,
we show both coe cients and hazard ratios in Table A1.
The first set of variables reports the political features of the municipality. The EQI index (institutional
aspect) is positive but not significant. The coe cient of the dummy female is also positive but also not
significant. Finally, among the dummies that reflect the political aspects of municipality governments, only
the dummy right is significant; thus, when the mayor is from the right side of the political spectrum, the
propensity to implement a PPP increases. This result is in line with previous studies on PPP determinants.
Among the variables that control for the financial side, budget≠resultit≠1 has a positive impact, whereas
the e ects of investmentit≠1 and subsidiesit≠1 are negative. Nevertheless, none of the covariates significantly
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a ect the propensity to invest in a PPP. In contrast, financial restraints proxies have a significant impact
on the propensity to implement PPPs. First, we observe positive and significant e ects for debtit≠1 and
annual ≠ paymentit≠1 on the use of PPPs, and these persist after 2011. 17 Debt positively impacts the
hazard ratio by 18% before 2011 and 14% after 2011, whereas the e ect of the annual payment is 31% before
2011 and 26% after 2011. Although the rule was found to have a negative e ect, this e ect alone was never
significant. As a consequence, we can conclude that municipalities have not used PPPs to hide debt, at
either the stock or flow level. Second, for the proxy self ≠ financeit≠1 (which captures the municipality’s
self-financing capacity), the rule’s e ect becomes significantly positive (a 6.7% increase in the probability
that PPPs will be used). This change may be explained by a shift in French municipalities’ behavior. Before
2011, for a given level of debt, the availability of resources for further investment did not a ect the propensity
to implement a PPP. After the introduction of the rule, a municipality showed a higher tendency to use
PPPs only when its budget is balanced, a trait which in itself represents a high self-financing capacity.
The results of the full parametric model, where survival time is assumed to follow a known distribution,
are substantially equal to the ones in the Cox proportional Hazard model (last six columns of Table 5 18).
Indeed, we still found that the levels of debt and annual payments increase the probability of PPP use. These
e ects remain positive and significant after 2011, whereas the interaction term is not significant. We also
found a similar result regarding municipalities’ self-financing capacity. The interaction term rule ≠ self ≠
finance positively a ects the use of PPPs. This highlights how the presence of internal resources became a
significant argument in favor of PPP investment essentially after 2011.
5.2. Robustness checks
We performed various robustness checks to assess the sensitivity of our results. These are discussed below,
and a summary of the main results are reported in Table 6. Detailed tables related to the robustness checks
are shown in the online appendix.
matching strategy and time periods issues. We have already shown how the treated and control groups are
similar not only with respect to the matching variables, but also by controlling for population characteristics
related to the 2000-2009 time period. We include, as an additional test, all matching variables in our
duration regressions. Our results are not substantially a ected. A further source of uncertainty remains in
the interpretation of the interaction term between the accounting rule and financial restraint proxy. In fact,
the policy’s impact can be anticipated or identified with hindsight by public actors. We therefore place the
rule at di erent years and find only non-significant impacts. Furthermore, external factors could exist that
influence the trend of the budget constraint proxy but that are also correlated with the PPP dependent
17. The e ects after 2011 are reported through the post2011 statistic.
18. Both coe cients and hazard ratios results are reported in the online appendix in Table A2.
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variables. An example would be a financial crisis that could make a PPP investment more costly for the public
buyer, especially when the latter is constrained in terms of total available resources (Phuong-Tra, 2014). This
e ect could overemphasize the rule’s potential impact; therefore, we would be potentially overestimating the
extent of debt-hiding motivations and underestimating the relevance of alternative channels. Given that
the rule’s impact is already not significant in most specifications, this potential issue does not substantially
a ect our final findings.
Moreover, to control for the validity of our strategy, in a previous version of the paper we perform a
similar analysis using a di erent control group of municipalities. Our main conclusions still hold showing as
our results do not strictly depend on the choice of the control group of municipalities. 19
Panel strategy. We propose an alternative empirical strategy in order to check whether our results depend
on the adopted specification. We chose to implement a panel strategy with a nonlinear model, where the
dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if municipality i invests under a PPP during year t. Applying
a fixed-e ect estimation with a nonlinear model can be problematic. In fact, first di erencing or use within
transformation does not permit the elimination of unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, attempts to add
municipality or time dummy variables to the logit or probit estimations will result in biased estimators due
to the incidental parameters problem unless the time period is very large. A possible solution for this may
come from using the traditional random e ect probit model. This strategy is appealing, but it assumes that
the unobserved components are strictly exogenous and thus independent from our covariates. An alternative
approach would be the Mundlack estimation, which assumes an explicit function for the latent variable.
This method allows correlation between random e ects and regressors and thus permits the marginal e ects
to be calculated. It can be applied to our full sample and comprises computing a random e ect logit or
probit estimation, including the average value over time for each of our regressor municipalities. This study
first estimates a simple OLS regression with clustered standard errors (by municipality). 20 Subsequently,
we implement the Random logit and the Mundlack Random logit approaches. 21 The main results are
summarized in Table 6, columns 1, 2, and 3. The clustered standard errors and the random logit estimations
substantially confirm the results of the duration analysis. As in the previous regressions, budget constraint
e ects are relevant both before and after the rule’s application. On the other hand, the new accounting law
a ects the impact of the self-financing proxy. When the Mundlack approach is followed, although the results
for the level of annual payment and self-financing capacity remain unchanged, those for debt level become
non-significant both before and after 2011. This last finding can be explained by the persistence of the stock
19. We further apply our duration analyses to the entire population of French municipalities with more than 3,500 inhabitants
using our matching variables as controls. Despite the fact that our duration models do not always attain the convergence (a
small sample of treated municipalities is compared with a large population of heterogeneous control collectivities), the results
of our main specifications are confirmed in terms of signs.
20. Results are reported in Table A3 in the online appendix.
21. Results are reported in Tables A4 and A5 in the online appendix. Tables report direct marginal e ects.
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level of debt over time. However, we do not face this problem when using flow instead of stock level proxies
for the budget constraint.
Endogeneity problems. Finally, we try to eliminate the debt endogeneity problem by substituting our fi-
nancial constraints with their values in 2004 (before the period of interest). The main results in the form
of hazard ratios are summarized in the last two columns of Table 6. 22 The results are not substantially
a ected, besides the impact of municipalities’ self-financing capacity, which is not significant before or after
2011. We essentially perform this robustness check to test whether stock proxies related to the time of
creation of the PPP market (2004) are still significant in explaining the budget constraint e ect. When flow
proxies are used, this robustness check is less important inasmuch as we cannot really expect that the level
of self-financing capacity in 2004 is really relevant in explaining the investment decision, for instance, in
2012.
6. Discussion
This study indicates di erent results demonstrating the impact of financial restraints on the use of
PPP. In addition, we find evidence regarding the persistence of this impact even when o -balance-sheet
accounting was no longer possible. The debt-hiding motivation is therefore not the only relevant determinant
in explaining why French mayors choose a PPP under conditions of budget constraints.
Some alternative explanations may explain this choice. First, we can also argue that even after the
introduction of the decree in 2011, debt-hiding motivations could persist. However, as discussed in the
Section 3, this explanation should not be particularly relevant, given the e ectiveness of the French decree
in ruling out accounting advantages. To back up this argument, we find that the decree shows its e ect. In
fact, before the rule’s application in 2011, the presence of internal resources was not a determinant of PPP
investment. Thereafter, the 2011 decree helped in improving municipalities’ attentiveness regarding their
financial situation before an investment decision.
Second, municipalities with high level of budget constraints may use PPPs to “avoid immediate capi-
tal expenditure, and related borrowing” (Eurostat, 2004). In fact, while under traditional forms of public
procurement an upfront spending is required when the infrastructure is under construction, in the case of
PPPs spending is usually spread out over a longtime period. Two explanations are possibles for this beha-
vior. The first one is linked to the opportunistic behavior of public actors. As discussed in Section 2.1, a
better public accounting in the short term may be interesting for public actors to gain voters’ support in
the case of high level of political competition (Phuong-Tra, 2014). Another explanation is more linked to
the need for e ciency, as developed by Engel et al. (2013). The idea is that the budget constraints that hit
22. Detailed results of the duration specifications are reported in Table A6 in the online appendix
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French municipalities may be temporary liquidity constraints that make current payments more costly than
future debt payo s. In this case, PPPs are preferred to traditional forms of public procurement to enhance
municipalities’ current financial situation and obtain better financing conditions in the long term.
Finally, and in relation with the previous argument, under budget constraints, French mayors may
consider PPPs as the most e cient organizational choice to minimize financial distortions. Indeed, following
Buso (2014), the involvement of private agents during a long time period in PPPs allows public actors to
save incentive rents. Decision makers can also benefit from the outsourcing of activities to a better informed
private agent as well as from the better control of lending banks (due diligence) over the project’s viability
and performance (Auriol and Picard, 2013). In fact, from the empirical literature PPPs are known to have
little cost and time overruns (Saussier and Tran, 2013). As a consequence, governments in municipalities
with di cult financial situation are under pressure to increase ex-post e ciency, which may also imply the
choice of PPP for suitable projects.
7. Conclusions
This study examines whether the use of a PPP by a financially stressed public authority is due to
debt-hiding motivations. Initially, we found that budget constraints are associated with higher use of PPPs.
However, contrary to the conventional wisdom among practitioners, debt hiding does not explain this e ect.
Indeed, the decree in 2011, which requires the recognition of PPP on the public account, did not a ect
the impact of budget constraints on the choice of PPPs. We therefore conclude that debt hiding is not
the only motivation for financially stressed municipalities to choose PPPs as an organizational form. In
fact, the accounting rule especially shows its e ectiveness in linking the PPP choice with internal resources
availability.
Our empirical results contribute to the existing literature on PPPs. We not only detected the e ect
of budget constraints on the use of PPPs but also analyzed the possible motivations that induce budget-
constrained public authorities to choose this organizational form. This study is, to the best of our knowledge,
the first direct empirical analysis of this topic. We also contribute to the public finance literature, as we
found that a large debt burden level is not necessarily connected with a strategy of o oading debt. This is an
interesting result in the context of a financial crisis, where governments worldwide are forced to cut budgets,
restructure service delivery strategies, reset priorities, and assume enormous new financial responsibilities
(Kioko et al., 2011).
This study also has several managerial implications from a practical perspective. First, our study provides
an answer to the debate among practitioners about the motivation of using PPPs for circumventing fiscal
constraints. Second, our results provide more insight to regulation instances such as the MaPPP. Since debt
hiding is not the only motivation for budget-constrained authorities to choose PPPs, the investigation into
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the e ciency of the PPP organizational form under public and private financial and fiscal restraints should
be developed and expanded. Moreover, we show the e ectiveness of the decree in 2011 regarding mayors’
behavior toward more balanced budget considerations when faced to the choice of the best organizational
form (self-financing capacity). On the one hand, this finding may help in these instances in improving PPPs’
institutional framework in the future. On the other hand, this result may encourage the private sector to
financially participate in PPP projects.
Our results can also partially explain why countries have increasingly turned to PPPs in recent years
despite all these criticisms. In fact, a 2009 OECD report stated that PPPs have grown to comprise a portion,
although not the majority, of capital budgets in several countries. 23 This evolution experienced a temporary
decline during the current economic crisis (EPEC, 2012); however, the long-term trend is expected to become
positive (Wagenvoort et al., 2010). Our research addresses a very relevant problem in the current situation,
where resources are scarce and extensive creativity is needed to incentivize economic growth.
23. The United Kingdom has had the longest experience, with PPPs currently comprising 10% to 15% of the capital budget
in recent years. France and Korea have had similar experience, with PPPs comprising 20% and 15% of those countries’ capital
budgets, respectively. Portugal reported the highest payments for PPPs, representing nearly 28% of the national budget or
9.4% of GDP; projects could eventually comprise up to nearly 20% of GDP (Posner et al., 2009)
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Table 1: PS Test
Variable Treated    Control %bias   t            p>t 
   
population_2009 35367         25448 12.5 1.35           0.181 
population_1999 33663         24598 12.1 1.28           0.202 
area_2009 28626         31886 -3.1 -0.47          0.638 
population_2009_men 16976         11728 14.2 1.38           0.169 
accomodations_2009 19662         14281 12.9 1.25           0.213 
main_residences_2009 16976         11728 14.2 1.38           0.169 
second_residences_2009 1240.9        1517.9 -7.2 -0.43          0.667 
vacant_accomodations_2009 1444.6        1034.6 11.8 1.24           0.217 
owned_residences_2009 6965.3        5266.6 10.9 1.24           0.216 
income_2009 4.7e+08      3.3e+08 13.0 1.32           0.189 
taxpayers_2009 20678         14983 12.2 1.32           0.190 
workers_2009 20195         14291 15.8 1.25           0.215 
long_term_workers_2009 18327         13000 15.9 1.23           0.222 
workers_1999 17857         12670 15.6 1.22           0.223 
population_15-64_2009 23938         16610 14.0 1.41           0.159 
unemployed_15-64_2009 2419           1658.1 13.3 1.43           0.155 
employed_15-64_2009 16637         11732 14.0 1.38           0.169 
total_firms_2010 3471.8        2432.9 12.8 1.34           0.181 
agriculture_firms_2010 46.94          37.58 15.8 0.93           0.354 
industry_firms_2010 155.95        118.12 11.6 1.25           0.214 
construction_firms_2010 241.12        194.08 6.6 0.94           0.346 
services_firms_2010 2466           1717.9 13.1 1.31           0.192 
trade_firms_2010 702.65        536.27 10.7 1.09           0.279 
public_firms_2010 561.76        365.2 14.3 1.52           0.131 
SMEs_2010 998.84        706.87 13.7 1.34           0.183 
No_SMEs_2010 268.11        196.87 14.4 1.19           0.235 
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Table 2: PS Test pre 2009
Variable Treated Control % bias  t          p>t          
taxpayers_08 26544 23728 3.3 0.24        0.808
net_income_08 5.8e+08 6.4e+08 -2.3 -0.16      0.874
total_tax_08 3.4e+07 5.5e+07 -6.1 -0.42      0.673
taxable_income_08 4.7e+08 5.5e+08 -3.2 -0.23      0.821
notaxable_income_08 1.1e+08 9.2e+07 6.6 0.51       0.611
taxpayers_07 26398 23598 3.3 0.24       0.808
net_income_07 5.7e+08 6.3e+08 -2.4 -0.17      0.867
total_tax_07 3.7e+07 5.9e+07 -6.0 -0.42      0.678
taxable_income_07 4.6e+08 5.5e+08 -3.3 -0.23      0.818
notaxable_income_07 1.0e+08 8.5e+07 7.0 0.54       0.591
taxpayers_06 26198 23445 3.3 0.24       0.810
net_income_06 5.4e+08 6.0e+08 -2.3 -0.16      0.873
total_tax_06 3.5e+07 5.5e+07 -6.0 -0.41      0.680
taxable_income_06 4.4e+08 5.2e+08 -3.2 -0.23      0.821
notaxable_income_06 1.0e+08 8.6e+07 6.7 0.51       0.610
taxpayers_05 25780 23239 3.0 0.22       0.823
net_income_05 4.2e+08 4.7e+08 -2.4 -0.17      0.864
taxpayers_04 25755 23259 3.0 0.22       0.827
net_income_04 4.1e+08 4.6e+08 -2.6 -0.18      0.856
taxpayers_03 25594 23261 2.8 0.20       0.839
net_income_03 4.0e+08 4.5e+08 -2.6 -0.18      0.854
taxpayers_02 25277 23001 2.7 0.20       0.841
net_income_02 3.8e+08 4.3e+08 -2.6 -0.18      0.855
taxpayers_01 24883 22830 2.5 0.18       0.855
net_income_01 3.6e+08 4.2e+08 -3.1 -0.22      0.826
taxpayers_00 24514 22288 2.8 0.20       0.840
net_income_00 3.5e+08 4.1e+08 -3.0 -0.21      0.833
taxpayers_99 24184 22021 2.7 0.20       0.843
net_income_99 3.4e+08 3.9e+08 -3.0 -0.21      0.834
taxpayers_98 23890 21870 2.6 0.19       0.852
net_income_98 2.1e+09 2.4e+09 -2.8 -0.19      0.846
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Table 3: Panel Dataset Description
Treated Control
101 obs 202 obs
PPP ≠ amount 32.3 0
Annual≠ investment 26.2 29.9
Operation≠ result 4.8 5.5
Overall≠ result 4.7 5.9
Debt 63.6 45.2
Annual≠ debt≠ payment 9.3 5.6
Subsidies 24.4 21.6
Reported value is the means in million euros over the period 2003-2012
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Table 6: Robustness Check Summary
OLS cluster Random Logit Ch. Random Logit
Budget constr. in 2004
Cox Param. surv.
debt 0.172** 0.172** 0.170 1.120* 1.089
(2.36) (2.39) (1.53) (1.79) (1.47)
rule_debt -0.0539 -0.0539 -0.108 0.997 1.060
(-0.78) (-0.93) (-0.79) (-0.06) (1.23)
N 2658 2658 1808 2392 2392
post2011 0.118*** 0.118** 0.0622 1.117* 1.155**
t 2.862 2.032 0.571 1.881 2.239
annual-payment 0.282*** 0.282*** 0.315** 1.274** 1.192**
(3.03) (2.88) (2.48) (2.38) (1.99)
rule_annual-payment -0.0649 -0.0649 -0.00710 0.947 1.033
(-0.79) (-0.92) (-0.09) (-0.82) (0.57)
N 2658 2658 1808 2392 2392
post2011 0.217*** 0.217** 0.308** 1.207** 1.232**
t 3.559 2.500 2.569 2.139 2.356
self-finance -0.00524 -0.00524 -0.00641 0.971 0.968
(-0.22) (-0.23) (-0.23) (-1.38) (-1.55)
rule_self-finance 0.0679** 0.0679* 0.111** 0.996 0.998
(1.96) (1.88) (2.45) (-0.15) (-0.07)
N 2658 2658 2658 2392 2392
post2011 0.0627*** 0.0627** 0.104*** 0.967* 0.966*
t 2.399 2.016 2.797 -1.730 -1.709
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
In the regressions the following covariates are included: population, income, n. of firm and year dummies
All budget covariates are computed as di erence with the reference group.
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Figure 1: PPP trend in France: Number of projects and amount at the municipal level
Figure 2: Kaplan - Meier Survival Estimate
28
Figure 3: Survival and Hazard Rate Curves
29
ONLINE APPENDIX
(Not for Publication)
30
Figure A1: PH Tests for Financial constraints covariates: Debt and Rule*Debt
Figure A2: PH Tests for Financial constraints covariates: Annual_payment and Rule*Annual_payment
Figure A3: PH Tests for Financial constraints covariates: Self_finance and Rule*Self_finance
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Table A3: OLS cluster estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment
EQI 0.0816 0.0834 0.0532 0.0578 0.0370 0.0315
(0.26) (0.26) (0.17) (0.18) (0.12) (0.10)
female 0.000359 0.000932 -0.00538 -0.00491 -0.0146 -0.0238
(0.00) (0.00) (-0.02) (-0.02) (-0.05) (-0.08)
left -0.0447 -0.0446 -0.0593 -0.0568 -0.0400 -0.0301
(-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.27) (-0.26) (-0.18) (-0.14)
center -0.586 -0.581 -0.618 -0.612 -0.623 -0.637
(-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.59) (-0.59) (-0.57) (-0.59)
right 0.540** 0.531** 0.503** 0.495** 0.546** 0.540**
(2.31) (2.26) (2.15) (2.11) (2.31) (2.27)
budget_result -0.0187 -0.0187 -0.0198 -0.0198 -0.0266 -0.0275
(-0.94) (-0.95) (-1.00) (-1.00) (-1.27) (-1.33)
grant 0.000113 -0.000348 0.00142 0.000902 0.00161 0.00457
(0.00) (-0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.10)
investment -0.0617 -0.0608 -0.0949** -0.0920** -0.0742* -0.0810*
(-1.37) (-1.36) (-2.09) (-2.05) (-1.65) (-1.74)
trend_rule -0.959** -0.958** -0.970** -0.970** -0.960** -0.958**
(-2.29) (-2.29) (-2.31) (-2.31) (-2.30) (-2.29)
debt 0.136*** 0.172** 0.142*** 0.145***
(3.32) (2.36) (3.39) (3.35)
rule_debt -0.0539
(-0.78)
annual-payment 0.242*** 0.282***
(3.96) (3.03)
rule_annual-payment -0.0649
(-0.79)
self-finance 0.0216 -0.00524
(1.24) (-0.22)
rule_self-finance 0.0679*
(1.96)
_cons 9.129* 9.214* 9.328* 9.408* 9.883* 9.813*
(1.72) (1.74) (1.74) (1.76) (1.84) (1.83)
N 2658 2658 2658 2658 2658 2658
post2011 0.118*** 0.217*** 0.0627**
t 2.862 3.559 2.399
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
In these regressions are included as covariates: population, income, n. of firm and year dummies
All budget covariates are computed as di erence with the reference group.
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Table A4: Random Logit Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment
EQI 0.0816 0.0834 0.0532 0.0578 0.0370 0.0315
(0.20) (0.20) (0.13) (0.14) (0.09) (0.08)
female 0.000352 0.000924 -0.00539 -0.00491 -0.0146 -0.0238
(0.00) (0.00) (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.04) (-0.06)
left -0.0447 -0.0446 -0.0593 -0.0568 -0.0400 -0.0301
(-0.17) (-0.17) (-0.23) (-0.22) (-0.15) (-0.12)
center -0.586 -0.581 -0.618 -0.612 -0.623 -0.637
(-0.55) (-0.55) (-0.58) (-0.58) (-0.59) (-0.60)
right 0.540** 0.531* 0.503* 0.495* 0.546** 0.540*
(1.97) (1.93) (1.83) (1.80) (1.98) (1.96)
budget_result -0.0187 -0.0187 -0.0198 -0.0198 -0.0266 -0.0275
(-0.97) (-0.97) (-1.02) (-1.02) (-1.30) (-1.34)
grant 0.000113 -0.000349 0.00142 0.000902 0.00161 0.00457
(0.00) (-0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.10)
investment -0.0617 -0.0608 -0.0949 -0.0920 -0.0742 -0.0810
(-1.01) (-0.99) (-1.50) (-1.44) (-1.21) (-1.30)
trend_rule -0.959** -0.958** -0.970** -0.970** -0.960** -0.958**
(-2.36) (-2.36) (-2.39) (-2.39) (-2.36) (-2.35)
debt 0.136** 0.172** 0.142** 0.145**
(2.42) (2.39) (2.53) (2.55)
rule_debt -0.0539
(-0.93)
annual-payment 0.242*** 0.282***
(2.88) (2.88)
rule_annual-payment -0.0649
(-0.92)
self-finance 0.0216 -0.00524
(1.12) (-0.23)
rule_self-finance 0.0679*
(1.88)
_cons 9.129 9.214* 9.328* 9.408* 9.883* 9.813*
(1.64) (1.65) (1.66) (1.67) (1.77) (1.75)
N 2658 2658 2658 2658 2658 2658
post2011 0.118** 0.217** 0.0627**
t 2.032 2.500 2.016
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
In these regressions are included as covariates: population, income, n. of firm and year dummies
All budget covariates are computed as di erence with the reference group.
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Table A5: Chamberlain’s Random Logit Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment treatment
EQI -0.0749 -0.0706 0.0358 0.0439 0.0584 0.0290
(-0.19) (-0.18) (0.09) (0.11) (0.15) (0.07)
female 0.131 0.136 0.0337 0.0391 -0.0541 -0.0344
(0.33) (0.34) (0.08) (0.10) (-0.14) (-0.09)
left -0.294 -0.285 -0.274 -0.277 0.0293 0.0178
(-1.09) (-1.06) (-1.00) (-1.01) (0.11) (0.07)
center -0.122 -0.0974 -0.221 -0.228 -0.673 -0.623
(-0.11) (-0.08) (-0.19) (-0.20) (-0.63) (-0.58)
right 0.531* 0.527* 0.422 0.407 0.569** 0.552**
(1.82) (1.81) (1.40) (1.34) (2.05) (1.98)
budget_result -0.0112 -0.0112 -0.0108 -0.0110 -0.0206 -0.0212
(-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.48) (-0.49) (-0.97) (-0.99)
grant 0.0105 0.0112 0.00121 0.00173 -0.00977 -0.000356
(0.19) (0.21) (0.02) (0.03) (-0.20) (-0.01)
investment -0.0436 -0.0471 -0.0731 -0.0751 -0.0255 -0.0301
(-0.58) (-0.62) (-0.90) (-0.92) (-0.36) (-0.42)
trend_rule 0.759 0.733 0.769 0.754 -0.955** -0.959**
(1.47) (1.42) (1.48) (1.45) (-2.34) (-2.34)
debt 0.120 0.170 0.0998 0.106
(1.34) (1.53) (1.34) (1.09)
rule_debt -0.108
(-0.79)
annual-payment 0.308*** 0.315**
(2.66) (2.48)
rule_annual-payment -0.00710
(-0.09)
self-finance 0.0400* -0.00641
(1.76) (-0.23)
rule_self-finance 0.111**
(2.45)
_cons -6.798 -6.698 -7.096 -7.175 6.717 5.960
(-1.35) (-1.33) (-1.37) (-1.37) (1.54) (1.35)
N 1808 1808 1808 1808 2658 2658
post2011 0.0622 0.308** 0.104***
t 0.571 2.569 2.797
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0.10 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01
In these regressions are included as covariates: population, income, n. of firm and year dummies
All budget covariates are computed as di erence with the reference group.
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